

# Nationalism in Ukraine: Towards A New Framework

Taras Kuzio

*Nationalism is the most abused term in contemporary Ukrainian studies. The majority of scholars have failed to place its use within either a theoretical or comparative framework due to the dominance of area studies and the Russo-centricity of Sovietology and post-Sovietology. Instead of defining it within political science parameters, 'nationalism' has been used in a subjective and negative manner by equating it solely in an ethno-cultural sense with Ukrainophones. As a result, scholars tend to place Ukrainophones on the right of the political spectrum. This article argues that this is fundamentally at odds with theory and comparative politics on two counts. First, 'nationalism' is a thin ideology and can function through all manner of ideologies ranging from communism to fascism. Second, all liberal democracies are composed of ethno-cultural and civic features and are therefore permeated by state (civic) nationalism. The article proposes an alternative three-fold framework for understanding 'nationalism' in Ukraine.*

Nationalism is a phenomenon that has been with us since at least the late eighteenth century; some scholars would argue that it predates the modern era of industrialisation and urbanisation. Nevertheless, nationalism

(and 'nation') continue to be misused or used in a loose manner by scholars. Barrington defines the misuse of these terms as 'used in a way that is completely outside how the term is used by nationalism scholars'. A loose use, on the other hand, 'is one in which the author has captured only part of the concept or has stretched the meaning of the term to an extreme degree' (Barrington, 1997, p. 712).

The misuse and loose use of these terms more generally within political science is made even more confusing by their definition in both a narrow and negative manner within contemporary Ukrainian studies. When 'nationalism' is used within contemporary Ukrainian studies, it is not placed within a theoretical or comparative perspective. I argue that the reason for this is because, as Motyl points out, 'The answer to the question "what is nationalism?" depends on the definition and, more substantially, on the definer' (Motyl, 1992, p. 308). How it is used and defined is therefore often more a reflection of the ideological and subjective preferences of the scholars themselves than any commonly understood definition of 'nationalism'.

This article seeks to survey critically the use of 'nationalism' as a term within

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Taras Kuzio, University College London

contemporary Ukrainian studies and to develop a new framework for understanding this concept within the Ukrainian context. The narrow definition of Ukrainian nationalism as used by Ukrainophone national democrats is criticised as being too narrow and subjectively based. Instead, Ukrainian nationalism is defined within the context of theories of nationalism and the relationship of nationalism to civic, inclusive states. All civic states are composed of *both* civic and ethno-cultural criteria and therefore, as Wanner points out, 'nationalism is a project of the modern state and an integral part of the process of state building' (Wanner, 1998, p. xix). This article therefore defines 'state (civic) nationalism' to be an ideology common to all civic, liberal democracies. In other words, *all* political parties that uphold the continued independence of the nation state are 'state (civic) nationalists'.

The article is divided into three parts. The first discusses nationalism within a theoretical and comparative perspective that broadens and deepens our understanding of the concept. The second section discusses the attitude of the right and left of Ukrainian politics towards the national idea and therefore, by implication, their relationship to nationalism. The final section provides an alternative three-fold framework for understanding nationalism that no longer focuses upon ethno-linguistic criteria that is common in area studies by placing it within the realm of political science.

## Nationalism: a theoretical and comparative perspective – Nationalism requires a host

What is nationalism and who are nationalists? Nationalism is a thin ideology when it stands alone; it therefore needs a host (Freeden, 1998, pp. 758–759). This host can be any of a number of innumerable ideologies such as liberalism, conservatism,

socialism, communism or fascism. Clearly then, 'ethnic nationalism' is only one of many types of nationalisms (Richmond, 1987, p. 4; see also Smith, 1971). We therefore find that numerous nationalist movements from the Scots, Welsh, Irish, Breton, Basque and those in former Western colonial countries are *both* socialist and nationalist. Nationalism projected via liberalism, conservatism or social democracy can coexist within Western civic states. Civic nationalism (i.e. state or pragmatic nationalism) is also often defined as that which encompasses all three of these trends. Western liberal democracies are defined as 'civic' and also 'nation states', reflecting the uneasy coexistence of civic and ethno-cultural factors within them.

Another way of defining 'good' from 'bad' nationalism is by differentiating it into *Risorgimento* and integral nationalisms respectively. *Risorgimento* nationalism is that of the oppressed seeking to create their own nation state by separating from an empire or by uniting separate branches of the same nation (e.g. Italy in 1860). Integral nationalism, on the other hand, is that most commonly associated with fascism or Nazism since the 1930s and is defensive, xenophobic as well as aggressive towards both national minorities and foreigners within an existing nation state. *Risorgimento* nationalism is perfectly compatible with an inclusive, liberal democracy and sustains civil society (unlike its integral variant).

Nationalist movements against France in Europe, against Spanish or Portuguese rule in Latin America in the nineteenth century, movements for self-determination in the tsarist, Austrian-Hungarian and Ottoman empires in the early twentieth century and anti-colonial movements in the post-war developing world all qualify as *Risorgimento* nationalisms (Helbing, 1997, pp. 225–226). The national democratic movements in the late Soviet era united democratic reformist with *Risorgimento* nationalist demands. Such nationalism was reminiscent of that commonly associated with the pre-1930s, when

nationality and popular sovereignty (i.e. national democracy), ‘were natural bed-fellows’ (Miller, 1996, p. 414). Nationalism along these lines can be highly positive, defending minority rights, rescuing lost histories and treasures, providing inspiration for cultural revivals, resolving identity crises, resisting tyranny, providing the base for popular sovereignty and promoting self-sustaining economic growth (Smith, 1991, p. 18).

## Nationalism and nationalists in Ukraine: broadening the definition<sup>1</sup>

### The misuse of ‘nationalism’ in contemporary Ukrainian studies

The term ‘nationalism’ is the most abused term in contemporary Ukrainian studies. When discussing the nationality question in Ukraine scholars are apt to use the terms ‘nationalist’ and ‘nationalism’ loosely, without defining their concepts. A study of Ukrainian nationalism followed in the tradition established by Armstrong and only defined it as the extreme right (Kuzio, 1997a; Armstrong, 1963).

Nevertheless, the norm in contemporary Ukrainian studies is to define ‘nationalism’ in Ukraine according to linguistic criteria as Ukrainophones. Because western-central Ukraine is primarily Ukrainian-speaking and the base for Ukraine’s national democratic parties, such as Rukh, then scholars define ‘nationalists’ in a narrow manner as Ukrainophone national democrats. Wise and Brown take this stereotype further by dividing Ukraine into the east, where 11 million Russians live, and the west, which is inhabited by a previously unknown ethnic group, ‘Ukrainian nationalists’ (Wise and Brown, 1998, p. 122). The only book-length study of ‘Ukrainian nationalism’ remains Wilson’s, a volume that follows in this framework by defining ‘nationalism’ in Ukraine solely with Ukrainophone national democrats

(Wilson, 1997b, Laitin, 1998, p. 291, Kubicek, 1999, Lieven, 1999, pp. 37 and 135–136, Birch, 1999, p. 1496. D’Anieri, 1999, pp. 21–40, 82, 176–178).

How nationalism is defined depends on the definition and, more substantially, on who is defining it (Motyl, 1992, p. 308). This has particular relevance to Ukraine because post-Soviet Ukrainian studies are not undertaken within a vacuum but within a three-fold framework developed earlier:

1. *Russo-centric historiography*: The non-Russian peoples of the tsarist empire were largely ignored in Western scholarly studies of ‘Russia’. From the second half of the seventeenth century Ukrainian history was subsumed within ‘Russian’ history and the ‘Medieval *Kievan Rus*’ became *Kievan Russia*, its culture and inhabitants *Kievan Russian* or ‘Old Russian’. In later periods Ukraine became West, South, Little or New Russia and its inhabitants Little Russians (Magosci, 1996, p. 11; see also Velychenko, 1992 and 1993). In the post-Soviet era the teaching of ‘Russian’ history has not substantially changed, despite the revival of new historiographies in the 14 non-Russian Soviet successor states (see Kuzio forthcoming – a and forthcoming – b).
2. *Sovietology*: The nationality question was largely ignored by Sovietologists. Many Sovietologists were influenced by post-war theories of modernisation and assumed that the nationality question had been resolved through the homogenising policies of industrialisation and urbanisation.<sup>2</sup> This meant that the non-Russians did not figure in Soviet studies (Chritchlow, 1990; Subtelny, 1994).
3. *Area studies*: Sovietology was undertaken within the UK within area studies departments and was not therefore integrated within the social sciences. Two of the four positions in Ukrainian studies created in 1996 as a consequence of the expansion of Eastern European

studies in the UK are in area studies departments. In academia in North America a better situation prevailed because scholars were first and foremost specialists (e.g. political scientists, anthropologists, etc.) and only then assigned themselves to Eastern European centres.

Consequently, 'As we would expect, the meanings and assignments to nationalism in much scholarly and most political discourse reveal more about the users of the term than about the phenomenon' (Motyl, 1992, p. 309). Nationalism is usually defined in pejorative terms by scholars who are studying post-Soviet affairs through their own biased cultural lenses, looking down on Eastern Europe for its 'illiberal' nationalism in the traditional manner of Hans Kohn's division of Europe into 'good' and 'bad' nationalisms (Kohn, 1955).

### National democrats and the national idea

The centre right in Ukraine are usually disparaged by scholars as 'nationalists'.<sup>3</sup> This contradicts the fact that they have always been strong advocates of polyethnic rights for national minorities and group rights for those who live compactly in defined territories (e.g. Tatars in the Crimea, Hungarians in Trans-Carpathia and Romanians in Chernivtsi *oblasts*). Such support for polyethnic rights makes them unusual bedfellows of their centre-right allies in the West, such as Britain's Conservatives or Republicans in the USA, who are opponents of multiculturalism, polyethnic rights and often regional devolution. Indeed, Jaworsky believes that one of the two factors that prevented the outburst of interethnic conflict in Ukraine were its political parties, 'which quickly reached a consensus on the need to provide guarantees for the rights of ethnic minorities in Ukraine' (Jaworsky, 1998, pp. 117–118). Of particular relevance here was Rukh, a party

that Kubicek remains convinced is 'the largest party with a nationalist orientation in Ukraine today' (Kubicek, 1999, p. 31). Many former political prisoners (who dominated the commanding heights of new parties) had always been strong advocates of minority rights. While supporting the introduction of Ukrainian into all walks of life (as stated in the June 1996 Constitution), Rukh also 'guarantee the development of the Russian language, the languages and cultures of all nationalities'.<sup>4</sup>

Why then are they denigrated as 'nationalists' in post-Soviet Ukraine when centre-right parties in Western liberal democracies who are usually opposed to regional devolution and polyethnic rights are not defined in such a manner? The Ukrainian centre right do not advocate the disenfranchisement of ethnic Russians or the total removal of Russian language and culture from Ukraine. But, as in all post-colonial countries, they do argue in favour of righting some of the wrongs committed against the Ukrainian language and culture during tsarist and Soviet rule through affirmative action.

The discussion over the degree and speed to which affirmative action should be adopted rests on three factors common to all 'civic' states:

1. The centre right are usually in favour of unitary states, and opposed to regional devolution or federalism. The exception to this are centre-right parties in federalised liberal democracies, such as Germany and the USA;<sup>5</sup>
2. The centre right are opposed to multiculturalism because they fear it damages the unity of societal culture and national integration;
3. The liberal and social democratic wings of the political spectrum support devolution, polyethnic rights and multiculturalism.

Rukh, as is commonly the case, is defined as 'nationalist' by scholars of contemporary

Ukrainian studies when other popular fronts, such as the Polish Solidarity Movement, are not. How then should Rukh be defined? Rukh can be only defined as ‘nationalist’ after its 25–28 October 1990 Congress, when it adopted a platform of state independence, and only until 31 December 1991, when Ukraine left the USSR (i.e. a total of only 15 months). Prior to October 1990 Rukh did not advocate Ukrainian independence and therefore cannot be defined as ‘nationalist’ but as an opposition civic group.

To define Rukh as ‘nationalist’ after December 1991 when Ukraine became an independent state is mistaken on two counts. First, it again equates Ukrainophones as ‘nationalists’ and all centre-right parties as ‘nationalist’, thereby placing them in the same camp as the extreme right. This is commonplace among scholars who define Rukh as ‘nationalist’ from the moment of its inception in 1988 to the present day. From January 1992 Rukh is no longer nationalist but a centre-right political movement/party similar to the British Conservatives, French Gaullists and American Republicans. Rukh is a member of the European Democratic Union, which unites centre-right parties, an organisation into which it would not have been allowed if it was indeed ‘nationalist’.

Secondly, to continue defining Rukh as nationalist after January 1992 ignores the strong support provided by Rukh for poly-ethnic rights for national minorities, its rejection of any anti-semitism, and its backing for automatic citizenship and an inclusive civic state. These are not the programmes of those commonly defined elsewhere as ‘nationalists’ (i.e. the extreme right and often even conservatives). Are then Ukrainophone parties such as Rukh to be defined as ‘nationalists’? Laitin thinks so and argues that only ‘nationalist deputies’ opposed the definition of ‘peoples of Ukraine’ (*narod Ukrainy*) in the Ukrainian Constitution adopted in June 1996 (for an alternative critical view see Kuzio, 1999a). These Ukrainophone ‘vigilantes’

allegedly use ‘nationalist threats’ and ‘provocations’ against Russophones, which ‘instils shame and guilt in many russophone Ukrainians’ (Laitin, 1998, pp. 100–101 and 141–142).

### The left and the national idea

The equation of nationalism with national democrats and Ukrainophones is undermined by the attitude of a large section of the Ukrainian political spectrum on the left which is supportive of Ukrainian state independence and who can also therefore be defined as state (civic) nationalist (i.e. *derzhavnyky*). This left-wing tradition has long historical roots in Ukraine going back to the late nineteenth century. The 1998 and 1999 parliamentary and presidential elections witnessed the evolution of Ukraine’s political spectrum towards a left committed to state independence (and therefore state or civic nationalism).

In Ukraine the centre left is now composed of four competing social democratic parties, one of which has close ties to the ‘party of power’ establishment. In addition, Hromada and the pro-reform Agrarian Party can also be included within this spectrum. To their immediate left are the Socialist and Peasant Parties which can be defined as pragmatic and are evolving away from the communists towards state-nationalist positions. It is to these various pragmatic left-wing groups that our analysis now turns because: a) their evolution towards state-nationalist positions has occurred since the 1994 elections and b) discussions of ‘nationalism’ in Ukraine ignore the left.

The policies of the IMF, the left believe, aided and abetted domestically, are ‘transforming Ukraine into a colonial state’<sup>6</sup> and transforming Ukraine into a ‘protectorate of international financial oligarchs and NATO’s puppet’.<sup>7</sup> These denunciations turn Kuchma’s arguments on their head by accusing him (not the left) of endangering Ukraine’s sovereignty and thereby promoting themselves

as defenders of Ukraine's independence. The IMF, the left believe, is undertaking a 'veiled form of colonisation and economic plunder' (*The Ukrainian Weekly*, 11 July 1999).

The left seek to turn the argument around and argue that it is Kuchma and his ruling elites who are likely to lose Ukraine its independence, and not the left themselves if they came to power. Socialist leader Oleksandr Moroz's aide, Ivan Bokyi, believes that it is Kuchma's socio-economic policies 'which are destroying independence, sowing social tensions' (interviewed in *Sil'ski Visti*, 10 September 1999). Moroz's presidential election programme denounced the 'immoral ruination of one's motherland and the physical extermination of millions of citizens'. Ukraine's revival would be undertaken by 'liquidating the banditocratic regime' and placing 'trust in one's people, its talents and traditions, and in the potential of the Fatherland' (*Holos Ukrainy*, 8 September 1999).

The October 1999 presidential elections were 'a chance to choose independence'. 'Independence', as defined by the left, would be 'real', no longer dependent upon 'foreign advisers', the IMF and other international institutions who have conducted 'economic and social experiments by political maniacs'. Ukraine should also not be assigned to any kind of 'special zone' (i.e. a Russian sphere of influence) (*Holos Ukrainy*, 26 August 1999).

The evolution of the left towards state nationalism was especially pronounced in the joint appeal by four presidential candidates (Moroz, Oleksandr Tkachenko, Yevhen Marchuk and Volodymyr Oliynyk) on the August 1999 anniversary of Ukraine's independence. The joint appeal was made symbolically in Kaniv, the birthplace of Ukraine's national bard, Taras Shevchenko. The appeal is noticeable in that it never once mentions 'socialism' yet it is permeated by state nationalism. They felt that a new executive needed to be elected as a 'rescuer of the state': 'It is evident that, if the current

president remains, our state will be finally ruined and Ukraine will lose its sovereignty.' They therefore called upon Ukrainians to unite because 'The Fatherland is in danger!': 'We will rise together and make Ukraine a rich, strong and respected country in the world' (*Holos Ukrainy*, 26 August 1999).

A common misconception among scholars is that the Ukrainian left are opposed to nation building, Ukrainian language and culture (which are allegedly only backed by 'nationalist Ukrainophones'). To what degree is this the case? The left and the 'Kaniv-4' bemoan the lack of national consolidation and unity under Kuchma (i.e. nation-building). They therefore place great emphasis upon building greater unity not only between different branches of the ruling elites but also between different regions of Ukraine. Thus they propose that different regions should be harmonised within an overall common identity and national idea. The language problem 'will be solved', Moroz promised if he was elected president, and Ukrainians would become 'united and consolidated' (*Holos Ukrainy*, 26 August 1999).

## Nationalism in Ukraine: towards a new framework

### Redefining nationalism in Ukraine

What is 'nationalism' and who then are the 'nationalists' in Ukraine? In the Soviet era the term 'nationalist' was used in a pejorative manner by the Soviet state for decades to vilify those advocating not only Ukrainian independence, but even greater cultural and political rights as 'bourgeois nationalist'. The Ukrainian historian Kasianov believes that 'Ukrainian bourgeois nationalism' was defined by the Soviet regime as 'any kind of show of national consciousness, cultural, ideological or political tendencies which did not coincide with state ideology on the nationality question and could (or, believed they could) threaten its rule or

become the basis for separatist tendencies' (Kasianov, 1998, p. 40). It is perhaps strange that scholars in the West continue to define organisations such as Rukh as 'nationalist', nearly a decade after the USSR disintegrated.

In a major study of the domestic sources of Russian security policy, four authors defined Russian elites after 1993 as 'pragmatic nationalists'. As Light has pointed out, 'Pragmatic nationalists represent the standard view one might expect the foreign policy elite to hold in any country' (Malcolm, Pravda, Allison and Light, 1996, p. 87). Such a pragmatic state nationalism is the same as we would understand to be civic nationalism in liberal democracies.

In other words, pragmatic state nationalists are 'nationalist' because they prioritise sovereignty and seek to defend by all means state and national interests (regardless of what language they speak, Ukrainian, Russian – or both). By only defining Ukrainophones as nationalists in Ukraine scholars have failed to understand state and nation-building in general, and in Ukraine in particular. Wilson, for example, would never attach the label 'nationalist' to Kuchma because he believed that no 'nationalist' could ever win the presidential elections in Ukraine (Wilson, 1997a, p. 83. For further discussion, see Kuzio, 1998b). This is only true if by 'nationalist' he understands this to mean the extreme right. In the second round of the Ukrainian presidential elections in November 1999, Kuchma, who portrayed himself as the defender of Ukraine's independence, faced Petro Symonenko, the Communist leader. A framework that only defined 'nationalism' in Ukraine as Ukrainophone will find it difficult to analyse how a Russophone (Kuchma) upheld a state-nationalist position and supports Ukrainian as the sole state language. The 1999 presidential elections in Ukraine showed that (state/civic) nationalism was a majority faith in the country and not therefore confined to only Ukrainophones or national democrats.

## A new framework for understanding nationalism in Ukraine

As outlined earlier, Western scholars have tended to define 'nationalists' rather loosely and negatively through their own prisms as Ukrainophones or national democrats. This has failed to provide a satisfactory framework for analysing Ukrainian politics.

Nationalism in Ukrainian politics should be therefore broadened and redefined:

### *Nationalists in the Soviet era*

1. *Democrats*: Rukh supported state independence and therefore a nationalist agenda from its October 1990 Congress until December 1991 when the USSR ceased to exist. Prior to this Congress, Rukh should not be therefore described as a nationalist movement because it had no separatist agenda.
2. *National communists*: Supported state independence only from 24 August 1991 when Ukraine declared independence. Prior to this date they backed the transformation of the USSR into a confederation of sovereign states (a second question to this effect was placed on the Soviet referendum ballot 'on a renewed federation' in March 1991 by the then Parliamentary Speaker Leonid Kravchuk). National communists, such as Kravchuk, can only therefore be defined as 'nationalists' from the declaration of independence until December 1991 when the USSR disintegrated. During Kravchuk's presidency (December 1991–July 1994) he did not adopt nationalist but pragmatic, centrist policies associated with his membership of the Liberal and United Social Democratic Parties.

### *Nationalists in the post-Soviet era*

1. *Extreme (radical) nationalists*: As in Western liberal democracies, nationalists are usually narrowly defined and refer only to the extreme right (e.g. the National Front in France and the British

- National Party in the UK). In the Ukrainian case, these can refer to either ethnic Ukrainian or Russian nationalists.
2. *State nationalists (civic nationalism)*: Using a broader definition, state nationalism refers to civic nationalism because it recognises that liberal democracies are composed of civic *and* ethno-cultural variants. State (civic) nationalists within the elites and population at large can refer to the ruling elite, the entire population and those political parties who support state independence and seek to defend Ukraine's national and state interests. This includes all of Ukraine's political forces ranging from the Socialist and Peasant Parties on the left to the far right. Pragmatic state (civic) nationalism is an ideology common to the ruling elites of all independent states. Centre-right parties, such as Rukh, should not be defined as 'nationalists' but as centre-right conservatives or republicans. *All* political parties from the Peasants/Socialists on the left to the centre right are state or civic nationalists because they support Ukraine's independence. They differ though on their attitudes towards how the national idea is to be defined. As in all civic states, the attitude of political parties towards the ethno-cultural context of the nation state varies. Centre-right parties are more supportive to giving greater prominence to ethno-cultural features within the state. The fact that centre-right parties in *all* civic states place greater stress upon the ethno-cultural definition of the state does not make them nationalists.
  3. *Soviet Ukrainian nationalists (unionists)*: Political forces, such as the Communists and Progressive Socialists on the extreme left, who seek to subvert Ukrainian independence, either through it joining the Russian–Belarusian union or a revived Soviet Union, are Soviet Ukrainian nationalists (as well as being unionists).

These political forces represent approximately 25 per cent of public opinion, a figure that is declining. But, to what degree are they immune from nationalism? President Kuchma, when asked if Ukraine would join the Russian–Belarusian union, replied that to do so would ignore the multinational composition of Ukraine's population (not all of whom are Slavs) and promote 'ethnic superiority'.<sup>8</sup> In other words, Kuchma defined pan-Eastern Slavism as 'ethnic nationalism'. The pan-Slavic regime in Belarus headed by President Alyaksander Lukashenka has an ideology that is anti-semitic, anti-Polish and (Russian) nationalist (*RFE/RL Newswire*, 3 and 5 January 2000).

## Conclusion

This article has sought to survey critically the use and misuse of nationalism within contemporary Ukrainian studies and it has argued that it is the most abused term in the study of post-Soviet Ukraine. It is incumbent upon scholars to use nationalism as a political-science term in the same manner to that when applied to other countries, both liberal democracies and former communist states. If we define Ukrainian nationalism as 'ethnic nationalism' (group 1 of the new framework) then it can be described as a 'minority faith' in Ukraine. Unfortunately, this would not provide us with a basis to understand nationalism because 'ethnic nationalism' has minority support not only in Ukraine but throughout Europe and North America. If, on the other hand, we integrate our discussion of Ukrainian nationalism within the social sciences we can broaden its definition of nationalism to that of state or civic nationalism (group 2 of the new framework). Ukrainian nationalism defined in such a manner is a 'majority faith'.

I have outlined a three-fold division of how nationalism can be used within Ukrainian studies by broadening its definition beyond

the narrow confines commonly used by scholars. This three-fold classification does not equate nationalists with Ukrainophones and national democrats, as is commonly the case among Western scholars. Language as a factor that defines whether one is a nationalist or not is therefore largely irrelevant when using such a framework. This framework also removes the temptation from scholars to analyse post-Soviet developments in a subjective manner through their own ideological or cultural biases.

## Notes

- 1 This article lacks the space to discuss the neglected aspects of state and nation-building in post-communist transitions. On these questions, as they relate to Ukraine, see Kuzio, 1998a and 1999b. On nation-building in the former USSR more generally see Kuzio, forthcoming – c.
- 2 This was the prevalent view among lecturers at the School of Slavonic and East European Studies, University of London, when I undertook my MA in Area Studies (USSR/Eastern Europe) in 1983–1984. Yet this was on the eve of the growth of nationalism in the USSR under Mikhail Gorbachev.
- 3 Andrew Wilson, 1997. See my critical review of the volume in Kuzio, 1997b, and the more lengthy discussions in Sysyn, 1997 and Kuzio (forthcoming – d).
- 4 Quoted from the election programme of Hennadiy Udovenko, head of one wing of Rukh, in *Uriadovyi Kurier*, 23 September 1999.
- 5 I am grateful to an anonymous referee for pointing this out.
- 6 Appeal of the Left Centre Bloc (*Kievskiy vedomosti*, 21 May 1999).
- 7 Heorhiy Kruchkov, communist and head of the *Rada* commission on defence and security (*Holos Ukrainy*, 8 June 1999).
- 8 Interviewed in *Izvestiya*, 11 November 1999. The head of the Press Centre of the Ukrainian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ihor Hrushko, also defined the pan eastern Slavism of the left as ethnic nationalism: 'The creation of any unions between Slavic peoples will be a kind of showing off of some ethnic groups in front of others' (*Intelnews*, 17 November 1999).

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