because they believed that would help cement democracy or because they thought it would make them richer? In all probability they hoped the answer would be both.

Perhaps the most sensible conclusion borne out by this brief survey is that it is only really possible to asses the role of the economy in association with all the other factors that were also present. Strong analysis is more likely to be multi-disciplinary and focused on individual cases rather than generalities. The economy matters, because in all countries, revolutionary or not, postcommunist or not, the material side of life influences ordinary people's sense of well-being. It also matters because its structure helps define power relations within society. But, anyone looking for simple cases of cause and effect, generalized patterns or unshakeable conclusions about how this or that economic factor led to this or that political outcome, is likely to be disappointed.

COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES ON THE FOURTH WAVE OF DEMOCRACY

Taras Kuzio

The democratic breakthroughs that took place from 1998 to 2004 in Slovakia, Croatia, Serbia, Georgia and Ukraine constituted a second and final stage of their transformation as postcommunist states. All five countries experienced national revolutions that prevented them from simultaneously pursuing nation-state building and democratic consolidation in the immediate aftermath of the collapse of communism. After the dissolution of the Czechoslovak state, Slovakia had to come to terms with being independent and with the challenge of co-existing with a large Hungarian minority. Croatia's war of independence monopolized the first half of the 1990s and the threat from Serbia only receded after the retaking of the Krajina in 1995. From 1988 to 1999, Serbia was dominated by Slobodan Milošević and his plans for a greater Serbia that were at the origin of unprecedented war crimes and chaos in the former Yugoslavia, policies that unleashed NATO's bombardment of Serbia in 1999. Georgia entered the post-Soviet era dominated by ethnic nationalism, leading to civil war and the loss of two separatist enclaves. Ukraine was key to the dismantling of the USSR in 1991, with 91 percent of Ukrainians voting for independence in a referendum. But, national independence came without democracy, with the state being hijacked until 2004 by the former "sovereign communists", turned centrists, under Leonid Kravchuk and Leonid Kuchma.

Therefore, the OK '98 campaign was perceived by the Slovak democratic opposition as postcommunist Slovkia's chance to complete the Velvet Revolution and to remove Vladimir Mečiar's populist nationalism that dominated until 1998. The Croatian opposition also sought to distance themselves from the nationalist 1990s in favor of a "return to Europe" through domestic democratic reform. Georgia's opposition sought to overcome the effects of a failed and dismembered state, deeply affected by stagnation under the government of Eduard Shevardnadze. Georgian analyst, Ghia Nodia, believes that, "our revolution in 2003 reminded us of the Eastern European revolution of 1989" when a new generation of non-communist elites came to power.[1] A similar sense of the unfinished permeated Ukraine's Orange Revolution that, for its leaders and supporters, represented the democratic conclusion to the national revolution of 1991.

This chapter is divided into two sections. The first section analyses ten causal factors that contributed to the democratic breakthroughs and revolutions that took place in

Slovakia, Croatia, Serbia, Georgia and Ukraine. These factors differ in their degree of intensity for each of the five countries. It is noteworthy, however, that the absence of all or some of these factors will prevent successful democratic revolutions from taking place elsewhere in the post-Soviet space. The second section discusses developments in the five countries under consideration in the aftermath of their democratic breakthroughs.

Causal Factors in the Democratic Breakthroughs of the Fourth Wave

Ten factors have been important for the success of the democratic breakthroughs and revolutions that have taken place in postcommunist states. These include a competitive (i.e. semi-) authoritarian state facilitating space for the democratic opposition, "return to Europe" civic nationalism that assists in civil society's mobilization, a preceding political crisis, a pro-democratic capital city, unpopular ruling elites, a charismatic candidate, a united opposition, youth politics, regionalism and foreign intervention. The latter two have both hindered and supported democratic breakthroughs, depending on the country in question and the foreign actor.[2] These causal factors are examined in the following considerations.

A competitive authoritarian regime

The replacement of authoritarian regimes in Slovakia (1998) and Croatia (1999 to 2000), and democratic revolutions in Serbia (2000), Georgia (2003) and Ukraine (2004), occurred in five countries that can be classified as "competitive authoritarian", with hybrid regimes combining elements of both authoritarianism and democracy.[3] As Silitski demonstrates in his contribution to this volume, Slovakia and Croatia exhibited some similarities to Serbia, Georgia and Ukraine, in which civil society mobilized to get out the vote and prevent election fraud.[4]

2 McFaul lists seven factors: a semi-authoritarian regime, an unpopular leader and regime, a united opposition, the perception of a falsified election, some degree of independent media, the ability of the opposition to mobilize and divisions in the security forces; see Michael McFaul, "Transitions From Postcommunism", Journal of Democracy, vol. 16, no. 3 (July 2005), pp. 5-19.

3 Steven Levitsky and Lucan A. Way, "The Rise of Competitive Authoritarianism", Journal of Democracy, vol. 13, no. 2 (April 2002), pp. 51-65; Lucan A. Way, "The Sources and Dynamics of Competitive Authoritarianism in Ukraine", Journal of Communist Studies and Transition Politics, vol. 20, no. 1 (March 2004), pp. 143-161.

4 See the special issue of Communist and Post-Communist Studies (guest edited by Taras Kuzio), vol. 39, no. 3 (September 2006) on "Democratic Revolutions in Post-Communist States". On Serbia, see Damjan de Krnjević-Misković, "Serbia's Prudent Revolution", Journal of Democracy, vol. 12, no. 3 (July 2001), pp. 96-110.; on Georgia, see Charles H. Fairbanks, "Georgia's Rose Revolution", Journal of Democracy, vol. 15, no. 2 (April 2004), pp. 110-124; on Ukraine, see Taras Kuzio, "Kuchma to Yushchenko: Ukraine's 2004 Elections and 'Orange Revolution'", Problems of Post-Communism, vol. 52, no. 2 (March-April 2005), pp. 29-44.

But, there were also three crucial differences. First, the Slovak and Croatian regimes did not orchestrate mass election fraud and did not plan to refuse to recognize a victory by the democratic opposition. The absence of these two factors, in turn, meant there was no need for the opposition and civil society to organize street protests, culminating in a revolution. In Serbia, Georgia and Ukraine, these two factors (election fraud and unwillingness to accept opposition victory) were present and instrumental in leading to democratic (or electoral) revolutions. Second, the Slovak and Croatian regimes were thought unlikely to use violence to suppress the opposition or crush street protests. In Slovakia under Vladimir Mečiar, the security forces were certainly involved in illegal activities against the opposition and in Croatia, some elements of the internal security forces may have participated in the war of independence in 1991 to 1995 or in war crimes. But, in Serbia and Ukraine, the bloated internal security forces engaged in serious crimes and violence. In the case of Serbia, the security forces committed war crimes in neighboring territories. In Ukraine, they committed violence against journalists and opposition leaders. In Georgia, Serbia and Ukraine, the ministries of the interior all had strong links to organized crime. In Ukraine, hard-line elements in the security forces may have received encouragement from Russia during crises. Third, external factors played a different role in all five cases, with the EU playing a positive role in Slovakia and Croatia, encouraging a democratic breakthrough with the "carrot" of membership, a factor which was absent in Serbia, Georgia and Ukraine. In Georgia and Ukraine the main external factor was Russia, which played a negative role. In Georgia, Russia's interference served to freeze the conflicts in Abkhazia and South Ossetia. In Ukraine, Russia intervened massively in the 2004 presidential elections.

The presence of competitive authoritarian regimes had profound implications for the potential of success of the democratic opposition in elections in all five cases and of the success of democratic revolutions following rigged elections in Serbia, Georgia and Ukraine. Competitive authoritarian regimes provided space for civil society, a limited number of media outlets and international organizations to freely operate in the country. Further, they provided space for the existence of a democratic opposition and their access to participation in state institutions (i.e. parliament and local government). Such regimes are, nevertheless, vulnerable during elections and succession crises and they can tip towards a democratic breakthrough, as was the case in the five countries treated here.

However, regimes can also shift in the direction of authoritarian consolidation. In this case, the democratic opposition will find it difficult to bring about a democratic breakthrough, and when such a regime commits election fraud, the democratic opposition's efforts to mobilize the protest potential of citizens are likely to be thwarted. Aside from Ukraine, Georgia and Moldova, which Freedom House classified as "transitional governments" or "hybrid regimes", the remaining nine Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) states are classified as "semi-

consolidated authoritarian" or "consolidated authoritarian" regimes[5]. Attempts at launching democratic revolutions in protest at election fraud in Belarus, Azerbaijan, Armenia and Uzbekistan have failed due to the weakness of the democratic opposition and because the regimes in question did not hesitate to use violence and to engage in repression against the opposition, the most notorious case of which took place in Andijan in Uzbekistan in May 2005.

"Return to Europe" civic nationalism

"Return to Europe" civic nationalism mobilized the democratic opposition and civil society in Slovakia, Croatia, Serbia, Georgia and Ukraine, particularly, young people. In Slovakia and, to a lesser extent, in Croatia, the EU actively encouraged democratic breakthroughs by proffering the "carrot" of future membership. The civic nationalism of the democratic opposition in Slovakia and Croatia competed with the regimes' own brand of extreme right or populist nationalism. In Slovakia, the Mečiar leadership built an authoritarian-populist regime whose nationalism was directed not at "returning to Europe", but against the Czechs and the country's Hungarian minority. During the 1990s, Croatia was dominated by the political regime of Franjo Tuđman, built on extreme right nationalism that partially drew its inspiration from the World War II *Ustaša* Nazi puppet state. A central demand of the EU was for Croatia to cooperate with the International War Crimes Tribunal, a demand that the democratic opposition, once in power, fulfilled to some degree.

In Serbia, the democratic opposition associated the break with the Slobodan Milošević regime as returning Serbia to its rightful European path, to which Yugoslavia had strong connections, as a communist state outside the Soviet empire. Yugoslavs were able to travel and work in Europe and the rest of the outside world, during a period in which this was unthinkable for most of those living inside the Soviet empire. In Georgia and Ukraine, "return to Europe" civic nationalism developed on the basis of the dream of becoming integrated into transatlantic structures and of departing from the vacuous, fluctuating and unclear multivector foreign policies of the Shevardnadze and Kuchma eras.

In the case of these counties, though, the EU was not as generous and membership was not part of the equation. Nevertheless, Viktor Yushchenko's opposition political platform supported a pro-European orientation for Ukraine that built on a national identity situating Ukraine in "Europe" and outside Eurasia. But, in Ukraine "return to Europe" civic nationalism was not uniformly strong across the country, being weaker in Eastern Ukraine, where the Orange Revolution found little support. In Georgia, the ethnic nationalism of the early 1990s, during which Zviad Gamsakhurdia briefly ruled the country, was replaced by Georgian opposition leader Mikheil Saakashvili's civic nationalism. In the meantime, Saakashvili has worked to rebuild trust in the state and its institutions among Georgians and "to inject national pride [in the citizenry] without making it ethnic pride".[6] He emphasized state symbols such as the national anthem and the state seal, and changed the national flag, a highly popular move.

5 See Freedom House, Nations in Transit surveys, available at www.freedomhouse.org.

Different types of nationalism can be used to establish a democratic regime and to promote the country's "return to Europe" or to institutionalize an authoritarian regime and to turn the country's back on Europe. Two other types of nationalism (Soviet and Great Power) are supportive of the establishment of authoritarian regimes that are not interested in returning their countries to Europe. In Belarus, the Soviet nationalism exhibited and institutionalized by Alyaksandr Lukashenka, has a stronger support base than the discourse of "return to Europe" civic nationalism promoted by the democratic opposition led by Alaksandar Milinkievič. In Russia, Vladimir Putin has successfully marginalized the democratic opposition and promoted a Great Power nationalism that combines Soviet, Tsarist and Eurasian symbolism.

A preceding political crisis

The nature of competitive authoritarian regimes inevitably produces an unstable political environment that has the potential to tip either toward a democratic breakthrough or authoritarian consolidation. Prior to the crucial elections there were scandals and crises of varying kinds in Slovakia, Croatia, Serbia, Georgia and Ukraine. The use of violence, kidnapping and murder against citizens led to a growing wave of protest and a real desire to stop the incumbent in Slovakia, Serbia and Ukraine from further consolidating the authoritarian regime. In Croatia, the Tuđman regime was involved in the ethnic cleansing of Serbs and other war crimes during the war of independence. The Milošević regime lost three nationalist wars in Slovenia, Bosnia & Herzegovina and Kosovo, committing untold atrocities. Serbia's intervention in Kosovo in 1999 led NATO to bomb Belgrade, a prelude to the democratic revolution a year later under the opposition slogan *"Gotov je"* (He's finished!).

In Georgia, Shevardnadze's decade in office led to stagnation, with a large part of the economy pushed underground, where organized crime ruled. Two frozen conflicts in South Ossetia and Abkhazia were ignored, while Adjara was granted *de facto* autonomy in exchange for political loyalty. In Ukraine, the "Kuchmagate crisis" of 2000 to 2001, when recordings proved that President Kuchma had authorized violence against opposition journalist Heorhiy Gongadze became the precursor to the Orange Revolution. Although this scandal did not lead to Kuchma's downfall, it triggered the Ukraine Without Kuchma and Arise Ukraine! opposition protests of 2000 to 2003 and severely undermined the legitimacy of the ruling elites, discredited Kuchma, created a hard-core group of opposition activists and awakened young people from their political apathy.

A democratic capital city

Unlike in authoritarian systems, competitive authoritarian regimes do not completely marginalize the democratic opposition. In the time before the democratic

6 Interview with Ghia Nodia by Robert Parsons, RFE/RL Features, June 15, 2005, op cit.

breakthrough, the democratic opposition will have been elected to local governments, gained control of mayoral offices and seats in the parliament. These local institutional bases of support were important springboards for launching democratic challenges to competitive authoritarian incumbents in Slovakia, Croatia, Serbia, Georgia and Ukraine. The National Movement-Democratic Front (EM-DP) won control of Tbilisi City Assembly in June 2002 and its leader, Mikheil Saakashvili, became chairman. In Ukraine, Kyiv's Mayor, Oleksandr Omelchenko, had long been sympathetic to Yushchenko, while Kyivites have consistently voted for reformers and the opposition in successive elections since 1994. The sympathetic attitude of Kyiv's residents and its city authorities was crucial to the success of the Orange Revolution. Revolutions traditionally begin in capital cities and a supportive city population and politicians are, therefore, strategically important to their success.

Unpopular ruling elites

The Kuchmagate crisis in Ukraine served to undermine the commonly held view in post-Soviet states that the leader is not at fault, but rather those around him, a syndrome commonly referred to as "good Tsar, bad Boyars". While Kuchma successfully deflected the blame for the 1999 elections, he was unable to following the Kuchmagate crisis. In countries where the "good Tsar, bad Boyars" syndrome still functions, such as Russia and Belarus, the chances for a democratic breakthrough are slim. An unpopular incumbent, unable to deflect blame onto his "Boyars", provides the incentive for a democratic opposition to unite, becoming a target on which the opposition can focus their energy. Putin and Lukashenka remain popular because the populations under their control do not blame them directly for their country's problems and no major scandals have besmirched their reputations. Democratic breakthroughs and revolutions took place in Slovakia, Croatia, Serbia, Georgia and Ukraine where there was an unpopular incumbent and a popular opposition.

The Mečiar regime in Slovakia exhibited similar characteristics to those found in hybrid regimes, such as Croatia, Serbia, Georgia and Ukraine. These included an executive seeking to concentrate its power, statist economic policies, no separation of the ruling party of power from the state, clientelism during privatization, interference in the media and attempts to marginalize the opposition. A sense of urgency developed: the authoritarian entrenchment of the regime had to be avoided. Two fears fuelled this sense of urgency. First, there was fear that if Mečiar's HZDS won the 1998 elections, Slovakia would move towards consolidated authoritarianism. Second, there was fear that such a trend would irrevocably harm Slovakia's chances of joining the EU and NATO.

During the 1990s, Croatia was dominated by the Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ) and Franjo Tuđman. HDZ claimed credit for Croatia's successful war of independence, maintaining the country's territorial integrity and putting paid to the Serbian threat. This nationalist success made it difficult for the democratic opposition to challenge the Tuđman-HDZ regime, which regularly accused it of treason and of being in the

pay of the United States. Accusations of being an American puppet were also made against Yushchenko in the 2004 elections in Ukraine. The retaking of the Serb enclave of Krajina in 1995 removed the Serbian minority as a threat that could rally Croatians around the HDZ, in the same way as Mečiar had successfully used the Hungarian minority to bolster support for the HZDS in Slovakia. The death of Tuđman in 1999, on the eve of the January 2000 elections, therefore, proved fortuitous for the democratic opposition. The removal of Tuđman from Croatian politics opened up divisions in the HDZ between hardliners and softliners over the need for continued nationalism versus the acceptance of democratization as a precondition for EU membership. The democratic opposition was also divided over whether to cooperate with, or oppose, HDZ.

Such divisions plagued the democratic oppositions in all five countries. In Ukraine, Yushchenko was loyal to Kuchma until April 2001, when his government was sacked. After that, he created Our Ukraine as a "constructive" (i.e. loyal) opposition force that vacillated between cooperating with the anti-Kuchma opposition (grouped in the Ukraine without Kuchma and Arise Ukraine! movements) and cooperation with pro-Kuchma political forces. Calls to rally around the head of state can attract support on the right of the democratic opposition, often willing to temporarily sacrifice democratization in exchange for nation-state consolidation.

Shevardnadze's For a New Georgia bloc, which had been hastily created after his Union of Citizens of Georgia disintegrated in summer 2001, began to fall apart after the November 2002 elections, thereby, creating a crisis within the Georgian ruling elite. Kuchma's For a United Ukraine bloc, which came second to Our Ukraine in the 2002 elections, disintegrated a month into the newly elected parliament. Georgia and Ukraine are examples of the failure of competitive authoritarian regimes to establish ruling parties of power. On the other hand, in Slovakia and Croatia, HZDS and HDZ failed in their bids to monopolize power.

Ukraine's ruling elites entered the 2004 elections disunited and unsure about the post-Kuchma era with many within the Kuchma camp unsympathetic to Yanukovych. They, therefore, either sat on the fence or unofficially backed the Yushchenko campaign. During the Orange Revolution, parliament issued a resolution refusing to recognize the official central election commission's decision to declare Yanukovych victorious. Parliament also voted no confidence in the Yanukovych government. By contrast, in authoritarian regimes, such as Russia, Belarus and Azerbaijan, the incumbent remains popular, while the democratic opposition is marginalized through what Silitski terms "preemptive strikes" or "preemptive authoritarianism".[7] Democratic breakthroughs and revolutions are impossible in countries with popular incumbents and marginalized oppositions.

7 Vitali Silitski, "Preempting Democracy: The Case of Belarus", Journal of Democracy, vol. 16, no. 4 (October 2005), pp. 83-97.

A charismatic opposition candidate

In Slovakia, Croatia and Georgia, the need for a charismatic opposition leader proved less important, as their democratic breakthroughs occurred during parliamentary elections. In Georgia, presidential elections followed the Rose Revolution and led to the sweeping victory of Saakashvili with 96 percent of the vote. His charisma certainly played an important role in the success of the Rose Revolution, his election and continued popularity. In Serbia, Vojislav Koštunica's popularity lay less in his charisma than in the fact that he could appeal to both camps. On the one hand, he appealed to the opposition because he was not corrupt and was not associated with the Milošević regime. On the other hand, for the softliners in the Milošević regime his moderate nationalist credentials made him a safe candidate. In this manner, Koštunica played a similar role to Yushchenko in Ukraine, whose candidacy assured softliners in the Kuchma regime, a role that the more radical Tymoshenko could not have played.

A charismatic candidate who does not have a past visibly marred by corruption is vital. It provides the opposition with a figure around which to unite. And, it gives hope to voters that not all politicians are "corrupt", a view commonly held in postcommunist states. Opinion polls in postcommunist states regularly show that voters believe that politicians are only interested in self-enrichment, not in voters' rights or the country's national interest. In Ukraine, public opinion polls conducted in 2003 to 2004 pointed to only two politicians with high moral standing, Yushchenko and Socialist leader Oleksandr Moroz. As a moderate and positively received candidate, Yushchenko was assisted by his main opponent, Yanukovych, providing a negative counterpoint. Yanukovych's criminal record, the widespread perception of Donetsk as a "Wild West" where everything goes, his low level of education and rough personality haunted him throughout the 2004 elections. Ukrainian youth NGO's learned from their Slovak, Croatian and Serbian counterparts that using humor and political theatre to satirize leaders with a dubious reputation would help to break down fear of the regime among voters.

A united opposition

A united opposition shows voters that politicians can rise above narrow personal interests and unite around a concrete election platform. The oppositions in all fives states were disunited throughout the 1990s. Only during the political crises on the eve of the democratic breakthroughs did the opposition unite, often after pressure from youth NGOs, civil society and, in the case of Slovakia and Croatia, with the assistance of the EU. This contrasts with authoritarian regimes, in which the democratic opposition is marginalized, imprisoned or in exile and, therefore, unable to mount a serious challenge to the regime.

The Slovak Democratic Coalition (SDK) united in 1997 around four main democratic parties and aligned with the Civic Campaign OK '98 that brought together 35 NGOs. In Croatia, six opposition parties met in September 1998, creating two opposition

coalitions to take on HDZ. These were backed by the broad based NGO coalition called GLAS 99, whose strategy drew on the success of the Slovak OK '98 campaign. The Democratic Opposition of Serbia (DOS) united 18 parties and several NGOs which, hitherto, had not cooperated, with the major fault line running between radicals and moderates, a division common to democratic coalitions in postcommunist states who are united more by what they oppose than by what they support. In Georgia, the opposition united around the EM-DP during the Rose Revolution, which merged into the United National Movement. There was little opposition to the EM-DP from pro-Shevardnadze political forces, unlike in Slovakia, Croatia, Serbia and Ukraine.

Youth politics

As discussed by Bunce and Wolchik in their contribution to this book, young people played a strategic role in democratic breakthroughs and revolutions in Slovakia, Croatia, Serbia, Georgia and Ukraine.[8] They provided the human resources in numbers for the NGO civic campaigns in all five cases and encouraged established politicians to overcome their differences and unite into democratic opposition coalitions. These young people are the generation that grew up in the 1980s and 1990s and that were least influenced by communist and Soviet political culture. The 1998 (Slovakia), 2000 (Croatia, Serbia), 2003 (Georgia), 2002 and 2004 (Ukraine) elections were the first occasions when this younger generation emerged as a serious actor in domestic politics.

Young people had already developed their political skills during preceding political crises, during which they learned from mistakes and honed their organizational skills. The mass civic mobilizations in the 1998 Slovak and 2000 Croatian and Serbian campaigns were diffused to Georgia and then Ukraine through shared training, publications and internet discussions, often with the assistance of western foundations and think tanks. Young people were most adept at using modern communication tools, such as the Internet (for email communication, as a source of news and as a discussion platform) and mobile phones (communications, SMS, camera-phones). Besides the Internet, domestic cable and international television played an important role in breaking the state's monopoly on information and in mobilizing voters.

In all five states, youth created movements that took the initiative to mobilize civil society. The most well known are OTPOR, KMARA and PORA in Serbia, Georgia and Ukraine, respectively. In addition to these well known NGOs, others focused on election monitoring, mobilizing students for civil society activities, strikes and monitoring the media. Polls and surveys in the region showed that youth tended to be pro-western and sympathetic to democratic values.

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8 See also Taras Kuzio, "Civil Society, Youth and Societal Mobilization in Democratic Revolutions", Communist and Post-Communist Studies, vol. 39, no. 3 (September 2006), pp. 365-386.

Regionalism

Regionalism can be both a contributing factor and an inhibitor in democratic breakthroughs and revolutions. Mečiar, Tuđman and Milošević's misplaced use of ethnic nationalism was one factor that the democratic opposition, who espoused an inclusive civic nationalism, opposed. In Georgia, Saakashvili's civic nationalism came after the disastrous ethnic nationalism of Gamsakhurdia that led to defeat and frozen conflict in Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Regionalism in Ukraine is a two edged sword. On the one hand, it inhibited a landslide victory of democratic forces in the Orange Revolution. On the other, it continues to inhibit the monopolization of power by potential autocrats either in power (as in the Kuchma era) or after they return to power (as in the case of Yanukovych in 2006).

Slovakia's Hungarian minority was used by HZDS and its nationalist allies to mobilize nationalist-populist support. The democratic opposition promoted an alternative inclusive civic nationalism that included the Hungarian minority. Ethnic cleansing during the war of independence made Croatia a mono-ethnic state, with the perceived domestic Serb threat being neutralized from 1995. Other than in the region of Vojvodina, Serbia has few national minorities on its territory. Excluding Kosovo, the Serb titular nation comprises 83 percent of the population. Many democratic parties, such as Vuk Drašković's Serbian Renewal Movement and Koštunica's Democratic Party of Serbia were in two minds about supporting the goal of a greater Serbia, backing the inclusion of all Serbs in one state.

The democratic opposition in Georgia inherited a fractured and failed state. Two regions, South Ossetia and Abkhazia, suffer frozen conflicts since the early 1990s. Shevardnadze struck a deal with the leader of the Adjara region (where many Georgian Muslims live), Aslan Abashidze, whereby he would provide political backing for Shevardnadze in return for non-interference in corrupt and autocratic Adjara. Abashidze's supporters were bussed into Tbilisi to back Shevadnadze during the 2003 elections. Shevardnadze further sought to maintain power through mass election fraud in Adjara, where the Democratic Revival Union won 95 per cent of the vote in the 2003 elections. In Ukraine, an unofficial agreement also existed between Kuchma and leaders in Donetsk, such as Renat Akhmetov, Ukraine's wealthiest oligarch. Kyiv would turn a blind eye to how local elites ran their fiefdoms in exchange for political and territorial loyalty. This loyalty was seen in the 2002 elections when the pro-Kuchma For a United Ukraine bloc came first only in Donetsk oblast. In all other Ukrainian oblasts, Our Ukraine or the Communists came first.

Of the five countries where democratic breakthroughs and revolutions took place, Slovakia is the most heterogeneous in ethnic terms and Ukraine is the most divided regionally. Ethnic and regional divisions should not be overestimated, though. Regional divisions, as in Ukraine, can lead to tension in the design of constitutions and power sharing arrangements between the center and periphery, but do not necessarily lead to violence. Ethnic divisions, as those present in Slovakia, however,

can lead to conflict. The one evident similarity relates to voting preferences. In Slovakia, only ethnic Hungarians vote for Hungarian parties. In Ukraine, voting patterns in the 2004 and 2006 elections closely followed linguistic cleavages that mirror regional divisions (i.e. Western-Central Ukrainian speaking regions voted Orange, Eastern-Southern Russian speaking regions voted Blue).

Foreign intervention

Foreign intervention can be benign or negative. The former can take the form of the EU intervening in support of the democratic opposition, as was the case in these five democratic breakthroughs and revolutions. The EU's intervention was particularly noticeable in Slovakia and Croatia, where it proffered the "carrot" of membership. In Serbia, NATO played a positive role by "softening up" the regime with the 1999 bombardment. This was followed a year later by U.S. support for the Serbian democratic opposition. The intention of NATO and the U.S. was clear: to remove Milošević from power. Russia and a minority of western newspapers alleged that the democratic revolutions in Georgia and Ukraine were "U.S. conspiracies", but such allegations have never been substantiated.

Of the five countries under consideration, the Russia factor has only played a role in Georgia and Ukraine. Russia did not intervene in Slovakia, Croatia or Serbia, although it tacitly backed the Mečiar and Milošević regimes. Russia also condemned NATO's bombing of Serbia. In Georgia, Russia chose to freeze the conflicts in Abkhazia and South Ossetia, rather than to undertake peacekeeping operations and hold negotiations on reunifying Georgia. The inhabitants of Abkhazia and South Ossetia have been illegally granted Russian citizenship and in December 2006 the Russian State Duma called for the unification of both enclaves with Russia. Russia intervened massively in the Ukrainian elections in 2004, providing political assistance and a reported US$ 300 million to the Yanukovych election campaign. Russia was also allegedly behind two of the three attempts on Yushchenko's life (the September 2004 poisoning and the November 2004 bombing).

After the Democratic Breakthrough: Main Problem Areas

Democratic breakthroughs as described in this book are never the end of the democratization process. Once democratic oppositions enter government, democracy requires further consolidation. In Slovakia and Croatia, the reform process was quicker than in Serbia, Georgia and Ukraine. The speed of the reforms and their success is related to legacies inherited by the new governments in each country, as well as the availability of external incentives to overcome them. Four problem areas have been central to developments following democratic breakthroughs in the countries covered. These are examined in the following considerations.

Dealing with the past

Dealing with the previous regime has proven difficult in many transition countries, whether Spain following Franco, Chile following Pinochet or Greece following the military junta. Most postcommunist states never undertook lustration or condemnations of communism. In most CIS and some Central European states, the former communist elites continued to govern after the collapse of the USSR. Dealing with the inherited past has pre-occupied and divided the democratic opposition in Serbia, Croatia and Ukraine, but not in Slovakia and Georgia. This may be because the crimes and abuses of office committed by Mečiar and Shevardnadze pale in comparison to those committed by Croatian, Serbian and Ukrainian leaders.

Shevardnadze and Kuchma were granted immunity during the democratic revolutions in Georgia and Ukraine. While, as Mason writes about Georgia, "[a]rresting officials of the old regime and their cronies has been a hallmark of Saakashvili's tenure",[9] in Ukraine immunity seems to have been extended to other Kuchma era figures and no senior official has been put on trial. Issues that were particularly divisive for the Orange Coalition after it came to power included the abuses of office that took place under the *ancien regime*, how to deal with those who are known to have been involved in Gongadze's murder, the treatment of the perpetrators of the 2004 election fraud and the reprivatization process involving oligarchs. Many members of Our Ukraine, including Yushchenko, had been loyal to Kuchma for seven of his ten years in office and proved unwilling to back the prosecution of former Kuchma regime officials. The unwillingness to charge the organizers of Gongadze's murder and the election fraud is linked to secret immunity deals made at the round table negotiations during the Orange Revolution. The issue of reprivatization divided Our Ukraine, which opposed the move, and the Tymoshenko bloc, which supported such it. The question of who would be responsible (a corrupt court system or parliament) for identifying cases for reprivatization was highly controversial.[10]

Dealing with war crimes in the case of Serbia, or crimes against opposition politicians and journalists in the case of Ukraine, is a test of the political will of the president and the ability of law enforcement to prosecute. In Serbia and Ukraine, law enforcement has failed the test. Koštunica and Yushchenko differ, however, in that the former denied the crimes took place altogether, while the latter raised them in the 2004 elections and Orange Revolution in his call for "Bandits to Prison", only to completely forget about them after being elected. Not a single criminal case against former senior officials has made any progress in Ukraine. Most of those involved in election fraud in 2004, in fact, were re-elected to parliament for the Party of Regions in 2006.

9 Whit Mason, "Trouble in Tbilisi", The National Interest (Spring 2005), p. 140.

10 See Anders Aslund, "The Economic Policy of Ukraine after the Orange Revolution", Eurasian Geography and Economics, vol. 46, no. 1 (July-August 2005), pp. 327-353.

Investigations into the assassination of Đinđić and the three attempts on Yushchenko's life in 2004 have also made little progress. Supporters of a "hard" transition want to see a more radical break with the former regime that would include punishment for crimes committed. On these issues Yushchenko, like Koštunica, has lacked political will and revealed a preference for providing immunity. An opportunity was missed immediately after the Serbian and Ukrainian revolutions to quickly deal with the former regime. Serbia has demonstrated the danger of adopting the "soft" transition, in that it permits the old guard the opportunity to regroup. Those who committed war crimes under Milošević went on to assassinate Đinđić. In Ukraine, the old guard regrouped after the implosion of the Orange camp in September 2005 and used public dissatisfaction and Orange in-fighting to win the 2006 elections.

Divisions in the democratic opposition

Slovakia and Georgia are the record holders for the once opposition-turned government staying in power longest. Divisions between radicals and moderates in these two states did not lead to open splits in the new governing coalitions. The democratic opposition is inevitably split between moderates and radicals. In Ukraine, the Orange Revolution coalition was dissolved by President Yushchenko in September 2005 when he dismissed the Tymoshenko government. Georgia is the only case where the democratic coalition has remained united and the moderate and radical parties in the EM-DP, led by Speaker of the Parliament Nino Burjanadze and President Mikheil Saakashvili, merged into a united party (the United National Movement), an unusual occurrence in postcommunist states.

A major difference between Georgia and Ukraine has been in the type of leader that came to power. While in Georgia, the radical wing of the Rose Revolution won the presidency, in Ukraine a moderate took office. Saakashvili's victory in Georgia has resulted in three post-revolutionary factors that are absent in Ukraine. First, it brought to power an "extremely motivated, extremely impatient" group of young politicians. Nodia points to Saakashvili's "massive energy" in pushing forward reforms, yet the drawback is that Saakashvili, like his Ukrainian equivalent, Yulia Tymoshenko, may have "modernizing authoritarian instincts".[11] Second, Saakashvili defines himself in opposition to his predecessor, Shevardnadze, while the more moderate Yushchenko has never criticized Kuchma after he was elected. The minimum his Orange voters expected was a moral denunciation of the Kuchma regime, which Yushchenko failed to deliver (the maximum would have been his trial for abuse of office). This led to widespread disillusionment among voters and their defection from Yushchenko to Tymoshenko, as clearly seen in the 2006 election results.[12] Third, Saakashvili has

11 Interview with Ghia Nodia by Robert Parsons, RFE/RL Features, June 15, 2005, op cit.

12 See the two detailed surveys conducted in Ukraine by the International Foundation for Electoral Systems (IFES) in April and November 2005. Both surveys are available at http://www.ifes.org/publications-detail.html?id=175 and http://www.ifes.org/publications-detail.html?id=270.

self-confidence in his policies and actions domestically and abroad. The same is not true of Yushchenko's dealings with Russia, particularly in the energy sector.

Of the five countries with successful democratic breakthroughs and revolutions, Serbia and Ukraine demonstrate many similarities. Presidents Yushchenko and Koštunica and former Prime Ministers Tymoshenko and Đinđić represent the split between moderates and radicals in the Ukrainian and Serbian oppositions. Gordy classifies Koštunica as supportive of "soft transition", while Đinđić backed the "hard transition" approach,[13] with Yushchenko and Tymoshenko taking comparable approaches to Koštunica and Đinđić, respectively. The difference between "soft" and "hard" transition lies in the attitude taken to dealing and breaking with the *ancien regime.*

Koštunica's Democratic Party of Serbia and Yushchenko's Our Ukraine lost popularity, leading to the return to power of *ancien regime* parties (nationalists and socialists in Serbia and the Party of Regions in Ukraine). President Yushchenko's Our Ukraine came third in the 2006 elections with only 13.95 percent, a major loss in comparison to the 23.57 percent it received in the 2002 elections. Orange voters migrated from Our Ukraine to the Tymoshenko bloc, which increased its support from 7.26 percent in 2002 to 22.29 in 2006, giving it second place. Since the elections, Our Ukraine has continued to decline in popularity, now having only eight percent of support, as a result of negative public reaction to its failure in the coalition negotiations after the 2006 elections. The Tymoshenko bloc's continued popularity has prevented the marginalization of Orange Revolution political forces, unlike in Serbia, where the popularity of Đinđić's Democratic Party has also declined.

The Orange Revolution coalition has not only been divided between the moderate Our Ukraine and radical Tymoshenko bloc. Our Ukraine had always been a "constructive" (i.e. loyal) opposition, with close ties to softliners in the Kuchma regime. The Tymoshenko bloc and Socialists were at the root of the real opposition to Kuchma during the Ukraine Without Kuchma and Arise Ukraine! protests of 2002 to 2003. In Our Ukraine there was also disagreement between national democrats and business centrists. The former refused to consider any relationship with the Party of Regions, while the latter preferred the Party of Regions to Tymoshenko. The dual track negotiating strategy of Our Ukraine following the 2006 elections, therefore, was not only the result of personal distaste for Tymoshenko's return to government, but also a reflection of the existence of two wings inside Our Ukraine: the pro-Tymoshenko national democrats and pro-Regions business centrists. Each wing sought to negotiate its own parliamentary coalition, Our Ukraine-national democrats with Orange allies and Our Ukraine-business centrists with the Party of Regions in a Grand Coalition. Such a duplicitous and fractious strategy opened the space up to allow for the return of the *ancien regime* in form of the anti-crisis coalition.

13 Eric Gordy, "Serbia After Djindjic. War Crimes, Organized Crime, and Trust in Public Institutions", Problems of Post-Communism, vol. 51, no. 3 (May-June 2004), pp. 10-17.

The return of former regime parties

Democratic breakthroughs in Slovakia and Croatia and democratic revolutions in Serbia and Ukraine did not completely remove the partisans of the *ancien regime.* This only took place in Georgia, where pro-Shevardnadze forces were routed without the slightest chance of their return to power. In the other four countries, the *ancien regime* retained a considerable base of support that enabled it to return to power in either a reformed format, as in Croatia, or in a wholly unreformed format, as in Serbia. In Slovakia, Mečiar's HZDS and its nationalist allies re-entered government after the 2006 parliamentary elections, albeit as junior partners.

Following a similar pattern, the democratic opposition in Slovakia, Croatia, Serbia and Ukraine saw their coalitions disintegrate once the democratic breakthroughs were achieved and the *ancien regime* was defeated. They were sufficiently weakened for the return of the partisans of the *ancien regime* to become credible candidates in subsequent elections. Often this followed strategic policy mistakes on the part of the democratic opposition and obvious disagreements between moderates and radicals.

In Slovakia, the 2002 elections marked the first time that Mečiar's HZDS received fewer votes than the left or center-right, although it still received considerable support with 29.8 percent. At the same time, the country had consolidated its democracy sufficiently for populist-nationalist forces to be unable to derail the course of reform or accession to NATO and the EU. Comparably, in Croatia, softliners in HDZ supported its transformation into a center-right conservative party, a process similar to reformers from the Franco regime in Spain, who created the Popular Party led by José Maria Aznar. The reformed HDZ returned to power in 2003, defeating the center-left coalition that had been elected in 2000. Yet, this return to power has not impeded Croatia's democratic progress and its likely acceptance as a member of NATO and the EU.

In Serbia and Ukraine, the *ancien regime* is more worrying. In Serbia, two pillars of the Milošević regime, the Socialist and Radical Parties, continue to command significant popular support. The Radical Party won the December 2003 elections, only nine months after Đinđić's assassination and in spite of the fact that its leader, Vojislav Šešelj, is on trial in The Hague for war crimes. In turn, in Ukraine, the former pro-Kuchma and oligarch Party of Regions won the March 2006 elections with 32.14 percent of the vote. After the parties that had carried the Orange Revolution failed to build a coalition, a so-called Anti-Crisis Coalition emerged with the Socialists and Communists joining the Party of Regions under Prime Minister Yanukovych, whose government has re-instated many senior members of the Kuchma regime.

In both Serbia and Ukraine, the *ancien regime* is a credible threat that could potentially undermine democracy in the years to come. In Serbia, the extreme left and right have a stable 30 to 40 percent of popular support and are more united

than the country's fractured democratic parties that led the democratic revolution in 2000. In Ukraine, the Party of Regions is the only former pro-Kuchma party to have entered the 2006 parliament. The SDPUo, the party that provided for the creeping authoritarianism of Kuchma's last years in office, failed to enter parliament. The return of the Party of Regions poses two serious questions to Ukraine.[14] Firstly, can the Party of Regions transform itself into a post-oligarchic and democratic party? Such transformations have taken place in East-Central Europe and the Baltic States, yet there has been no such case in any CIS country. Second, will the return of Yanukovych to government lead to a reversal of the gains of the Orange Revolution? Observers have pointed out, that "it would be wrong to conclude that little has changed. Ukraine today is a different country from the timid nation that existed before the Orange Revolution. There is a greater sense of freedom and a stronger sense of national identity".[15] While a reversal of these gains seems unlikely as the Party of Regions has insufficient nationwide popularity to monopolize power, stagnation in the democratic reform process is possible.

Serbia is facing very similar questions. But, Serbia has one distinct advantage over Ukraine. EU membership, however distant, remains a prospect for Serbia and could encourage democratic progress. Ukraine, in turn, is only being offered a free trade agreement, following its accession to the WTO, and an enhanced agreement to replace the current Partnership and Cooperation Agreement.

Democratization

The victories of the Slovak and Croatian democratic oppositions over competitive authoritarian regimes in 1998 and 1999 to 2000, respectively, constituted real democratic breakthroughs in both countries. Success in Slovakia's democratic reforms and the dismantling of the Mečiar legacy led to membership of NATO in 2002 and the EU in 2004. NATO invited Croatia into the Membership Action Plan in May 2002 and it may be invited to join NATO in 2008. Croatia is also likely to be invited to join the EU any time soon, in contrast to Serbia, Georgia and Ukraine. The latter three countries, those that undertook more fully-fledged democratic revolutions, have more difficult legacies to overcome and are grappling with entrenched remnants of the *ancien regime*.[16]

Basic democratic freedoms, such as support for civil society, media freedom, free elections, support for democracy over the alternative of authoritarianism, are positive outcomes of the democratic breakthroughs and revolutions in all five countries. Serbia, Georgia and Ukraine have poorer records of democratic progress than Slovakia and Croatia, though. Slovakia is classified in Freedom House's 2006 Nations in Transit report as a "consolidated democracy", whereas Croatia and Serbia are defined as "semi-consolidated democracies". Georgia and Ukraine are considered to be "transitional" or "hybrid" regimes. Freedom House's 2006 Freedom in the World survey upgraded Ukraine to "Free", joining Slovakia, Croatia and Serbia, while Georgia is classified as "Partly Free".[17]

Democratization in Georgia and Ukraine has improved following their democratic revolutions. Both countries hold free elections and enjoy free media. The interior ministries in both countries, which had ties to organized crime and were involved in illegal violence against regime opponents and journalists, have been cleaned up. Freedom House's 2006 Nations in Transit survey gives credit to Georgia for enhancing local government capacity, launching a struggle against corruption and improving the protection of human rights, but registered no change in Georgia's election administration, civil society, media and national governance. According to Ghia Nodia, one of the reasons for the decline in civil society activity following the Rose Revolution is that "half" of civil society moved into government. In Ukraine, Freedom House registered a vastly improved media environment with an end to censorship, greater transparency in government and state activities and policies and a free election environment. Nevertheless, problem areas remain. Georgia lacks a strong opposition, partly because of the high threshold to enter parliament (seven percent) and the judiciary is subject to political interference. Political parties in Georgia and Ukraine remain weak and tied to personality politics, rather than to ideologies. This is especially true of the radical wing of democratic oppositions that came to power in 2003 to 2004, including Saakashvili and Tymoshenko.

Democratization has proceeded faster in postcommunist states, which have introduced parliamentary systems, commonplace in East Central Europe and the three Baltic States. During postcommunist transitions, abuse of office, election fraud and corruption has tended to occur around the executive. Of the twelve CIS states, ten have super presidential systems with emasculated parliaments. The exceptions are a parliamentary-presidential system in Ukraine and a fully parliamentary system in Moldova.

The victory of democratic oppositions in Slovakia and Croatia convinced their leaders of the need to temper executive power, because it had been abused during the Mečiar and Tuđman competitive authoritarian regimes. In 2000, Croatia moved from a semi-presidential to a parliamentary system and from a bicameral into a unicameral parliament. Round table negotiations during the Orange Revolution led to a political compromise in the ruling elite that included three elements: an unwritten agreement on immunity from prosecution, reform of the election law and constitutional reform in 2006. The constitutional reforms transformed Ukraine from

14 See Taras Kuzio, "The Orange Revolution at a Crossroads", Demokratizatsiya, vol. 14, no. 4 (Fall 2006), pp. 477-492.

15 Stefan Wagstyl, "Ukraine: Orange Revolution Gives Way to Reality", Financial Times, December 15, 2006.

16 See Steven Levitsky and Lucan A. Way, "International Linkage and Democratization", Journal of Democracy, vol. 16, no. 3 (July 2005), pp. 20-34.

17 See Freedom House Nations in Transit surveys, available at www.freedomhouse.org.

the 1996 semi-presidential system to a parliamentary-presidential republic, reducing presidential powers, transferring them to the prime minister and introducing control of government by parliamentary majorities, rather than by the executive.

Conclusion

Slovakia rejoined "Europe" relatively quickly after the 1998 democratic breakthrough. This, in itself, demonstrated that Mečiar's populist nationalism was more of an aberration than a factor that could permanently derail Slovakia's democratization. Croatia has also quickly moved forward in capitalizing on its 1999 to 2000 democratic breakthrough and is likely to accede to NATO and the EU within a few years.

Serbia, Georgia and Ukraine's records are very mixed, though. EU membership, which could be encouraging to democratic political forces in the face of still significant domestic support for the *ancien regime*, is only a real, even if distant, prospect for Serbia. But, Serbia will not overcome the Milošević legacy quickly, as the extreme left and nationalist right continue to have a strong base of support in the country. In Georgia and Ukraine, democratization will be complicated by the absence of any offer of EU membership and, in the case of Ukraine, by the return to power of the Party of Regions, strongly associated with the *ancien regime*. Democratic freedoms, free elections, independent media and political competition have all improved in Georgia and Ukraine since their democratic revolutions, but both countries still face major hurdles, especially in asserting the rule of law and in effectively eradicating corruption.

Internationally, Serbia is located in a neighborhood where most states are consolidated democracies, a factor that could lead to democratic diffusion. Geography does not comparably favor Georgia, which borders three authoritarian states, including a large and threatening neighbor, Russia, that controls its two separatist enclaves and opposes its integration into transatlantic structures and only one democracy, that being Turkey. In fact, Georgia's geography is its Achilles' heel, making NATO membership likely, although not EU membership. Ukraine, in turn, borders four NATO and EU member states, semi-democratic Moldova and authoritarian Belarus and Russia. Thus, although not in the most advantageous position, the democratic revolutions that took place in Georgia and Ukraine are, nevertheless, testament to their desire to establish democratic societies that are firmly embedded in Euroatlantic institutions.

WHERE NEXT OR WHAT NEXT?

Ivan Krastev

The beginning of the 21st century was marked by an explosion of electoral revolutions in Eastern Europe. A "bulldozer" revolution put an end to the criminal regime of Slobodan Milošević in Serbia. The Rose Revolution changed the color of the political regime in Georgia and the Orange Revolution brought an end to kleptocratic rule in Kyiv.[1] All three revolutions were nonviolent, liberal and pro-western. They looked like the second coming of 1989.

The color revolutions captured the imagination of the West with the promise that liberal democratic revolutions can even be successful in countries with troubled pasts, post-conflict presents and where institutions are weak and incomes low. At the very moment the idea of liberal democratic revolution was both defeated and discredited in the Middle East, true-believers of universal democracy found their hopes fulfilled and spirits lifted by events in Georgia and Ukraine. Georgia and Ukraine were viewed as leaders of a new wave of democratic change in the world. The anti-Syrian electoral revolution in Lebanon further strengthened this impression.

In the view of many democracy activists the only relevant questions were how many more weeks in power Alyaksandr Lukashenka in Minsk would survive and where the next color revolution would take place. Political theorists and democracy activists were convinced that color revolutions were a pattern for democratic change that would spread all over Eastern Europe and Central Asia. Replicating color revolutions was the winning strategy for the future.

At the time, these color revolutions were varyingly conceptualized as a) liberal revolutions, b) EU inspired revolutions, c) NGO revolutions and d) a model for the next generation of democratic revolutions. Two years on, all these ideas about color revolutions require profound rethinking.

It could turn out that, in their nature, these color revolutions have more in common with the recent populist revolutions in Latin America, than with the liberal revolutions in Central and Eastern Europe of 1989. NGO-centric interpretations of the color revolutions have so far tended to be a marriage of ideological convenience and institutional self-interest, more than a fair reflection on the real strength of the civil society actors involved. And, the notion that color revolutions represent a model of democratic change that can be replicated might not only be incorrect, but even dangerous, if considering how to develop strategies for assisting democracy in the post-Soviet space.

1 The "Tulip Revolution" in Kyrgyzstan has suspiciously disappeared from the list of color revolutions in the literature on the subject.