

on this topic, Gregory Massell and Doug Northrop. Her conclusions are different, she argues, because she interviews and reads the memoirs of local women in their own Uzbek language. She still argues that the state was domineering and interested in women's emancipation primarily for its own purposes. But she tries to get at women's own relations to the *otin* (the woman religious teacher) and the veil.

Kamp also steps beyond the veil question to ask about the success of the Soviet Communist Party's efforts in women's education (often accompanied by vilifying and scapegoating the *otin*), in contrast to their lesser impact on marriage and the family. The short answer to the success of the one and failure of the other seems to be that long-term Jadid efforts to bring education to women were bearing fruit, while the Party's decision to leave marital relations in the hands of local religious authorities meant that under-age marriage, coerced marriages, bride price, and even polygynous marriage continued when the religious authorities turned a blind eye.

Ultimately, for me the most interesting part of the book was that challenging historical question, agency. Kamp reminds us that if a woman refused to unveil, that refusal could be chalked up to her husband's and female relatives' conservative influence. If, on the other hand, she unveiled, it could have been the result of the party's pressure on her and/or on her husband. In her interviews (which make the book extremely lively), Kamp finds a variety of answers that women themselves give. Often they talk about their own decisions; yet they are also clearly intertwined with family and society in important ways. Perhaps the most dramatic material is the stories of women re-veiling after they found it virtually impossible to walk the streets of their local towns and cities without being covered.

Similarly, Kamp insists on exploring the motivations of the male murderers of women who unveiled, arguing that they were not simply reacting to a perceived affront by the colonial state. These men operated in coercive, premeditated ways against the women in their own communities. Kamp uses records from the secret police (OGPU) to show that it was not just the clergy who incited violence against women. It was also village council chairman and local Party authorities who made indecent proposals to women and even kidnapped and raped them. This part of the book is important for understanding the violence endemic in Russian and Uzbek society during the Terror, the ways in which people (usually men) in positions of authority abused their power in countless ways.

The New Woman in Uzbekistan is an important book both for specialists and general readers. Kamp has courageously dived into some of the most controversial and moving stories of Central Asian women's lives. The result is a rich, multifaceted book that makes for fascinating reading.

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Stephen Velychenko, ed. *Ukraine, The EU and Russia: History, Culture and International Relations*. Studies in Central and Eastern Europe. New York: Palgrave, 2007. 208 pp. Notes. Index. \$90.00, cloth.

Although the title of the volume would lead the reader to believe that the book deals with Ukraine-EU relations, the reality is that it has very little to do with this subject. Instead, a more adequate title for the book that reflected its contents would have been along the lines of "Ukraine's National Identity and Foreign Policy." Six out of eight chapters survey how Ukraine's national identity impacts upon Ukraine's foreign policy and foreign orientation, within which the EU (and NATO) are important components.

The volume is testimony to why historians and cultural specialists should not venture into the twin fields of political science and international relations (and vice versa). None of the leading experts on Ukraine's foreign policy and Ukraine-EU relations either from the West or from Ukraine, Russia and Poland are included in the volume. The book fails, therefore, to fulfil a major aim that such volumes should strive to achieve; namely, to add something new to the existing literature. This, the volume fails to do by ignoring expertise in studies of Ukrainian foreign policy and Ukraine-EU relations built up over the last two decades.

The book is a confusing collection of articles that are varied in quality—alas, something that is common in edited volumes. Ultimately it is unclear exactly what the focus of the book is and this is clearly seen in the incoherent introduction to the volume by the editor, Stephen Velychenko. Velychenko's title "Ukraine: EU member or a Second Belarus?" is itself a misnomer. Whether or not Ukraine will become an EU member has nothing to do with any pro-Russian orientation in Ukraine (unlike Ukraine's potential membership of NATO) and nothing at all to do with Ukraine following Alyaksandr Lukashenka's Belarus. If the most Russophile country in the CIS—Belarus—proved unable to establish a union state with Russia, there are zero chances of Ukraine accomplishing this impossible feat. Whether Ukraine is given a future membership perspective by the EU will be ultimately decided in Brussels—not Moscow. The EU's double standard of not offering membership prospects towards Ukraine's young democracy is unsustainable when at the same time it offers membership to the Western Balkans and Turkey. Ukraine's muddled reforms and crises are not cause for denying membership, as the EU offered Romania and Bulgaria membership prospects before they embarked on any reforms and at a time when they looked far more stagnant than post-Orange Revolution Ukraine.

The volume fails to tackle these vital issues in EU-Ukraine relations. The views of Russian political parties towards Ukraine are amply covered in chapters such as M. Beisswenger's on Eurasianism (easily one of the best chapters, but I remain unsure why it is included). Unfortunately, there is no equivalent of Beisswenger that deals with Ukrainian political parties and their attitudes towards Ukraine's foreign orientation. Another chapter by R. Serbyn deals thoroughly with how World War II is commemorated, but again it remains unclear why it is also included in the volume. M. Pavlyshyn and O. Ilnytskyj cover culture and its impact upon national identity.

M. Riabchuk writes about a topic that he is very familiar with, as he has covered it in earlier articles; namely, that of Ukraine's ambivalent identity torn between east and west. Unfortunately Riabchuk continues to confuse readers by adhering to the misplaced concept of Ukraine divided into two "more or less equal ethno-linguistic groups," Russophones and Ukrainophones (p.74). Such an artificial division ignores real life fluidity where a large group of Ukrainians are bilingual and which polls find to be as large as pure Ukrainophones and Russophones. Are they, as Riabchuk claims, "Two Ukraines" (p.78) or many Ukraines, as occurs in many countries. Recent surveys undertaken by Ukraine's best think tank, the Centre for Economic and Political Studies (Razumkov Centre), show that Ukrainophones and Russophones are not divided "on virtually every fundamental issue." While NATO is divisive, the EU is not and even then NATO is close to the bottom of important issues for Party of Regions voters.

Two chapters that deal with EU-Ukraine relations by O. Semenyi and I. Solonenko go some way towards re-balancing the volume by focusing on concrete issues in a troubled relationship. Nevertheless, Semenyi's short ten-page chapter fails to do justice to the subject and focuses wrongly on the CIS Single Economic Space (SES) as an alternative to the EU, which it never was. Ukraine's unwillingness to take all three steps in the CIS SES

during Leonid Kuchma's presidency, unlike Russia, Belarus and Kazakhstan, meant this was even less likely under President Viktor Yushchenko. Solonenko's is a more solid study of the EU's impact on democratic transformation in Ukraine and she concludes that the EU has not possessed "a strategic commitment to integrate Ukraine" (p.145). At the same time, she does credit the EU with supporting civil society and institutions that went some way towards providing the basis for the Orange Revolution. It is more likely that the US provided greater assistance than the EU towards Ukraine's civil society and the US certainly provided greater diplomatic support during the Orange Revolution.

The final chapter by J. R. Gillingham is as confusing as the Introduction. Including only six references, four of which are by the author, the chapter is an unbalanced critique of an allegedly "weakening EU" that "has begun to fall apart" (p.151). Such strong sentiments pepper the chapter (i.e., the EU "lacks legitimacy" [p.152]) and most of them are wrong. Gillingham argues that Ukraine should, therefore, focus on NATO rather than the EU. As all post-communist countries, including Ukraine, see NATO membership as a stepping stone to eventual EU membership, Gillingham is simply stating the obvious. Gillingham ignores the more divisive nature of NATO within Ukraine, compared to the EU which does not conjure up opposition except on the extreme left. The Party of Regions will choose the Deep Free Trade Area with the EU over the CIS SES, but is cautious about, or hostile towards, NATO. NATO membership by 2008, which Gillingham believes "is administratively and technically realistic" (p.163), is not likely until the medium term and the main Western European opponents of both Ukraine's NATO and EU membership are Germany and France (with Russia only a factor in the NATO case through Russia's close relations with Germany).

Books on Ukrainian foreign policy are scarce. Nevertheless, this volume has not been adequately thought out and is less a book on Ukraine-EU relations than on Ukraine's national identity and foreign policy. It would have benefitted from focusing on Ukraine-NATO relations, since NATO membership has the potential to open up divisions inside the country based on national identity.

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Loren Graham and Irina Dezhina. *Science in the New Russia*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2008. 216 pp. List of acronyms. Notes. Index. \$22.95, paper.

One of the most significant achievements of Soviet power was the creation of the largest research and development (R and D) apparatus in the world. The break-up of the USSR had an immediate and negative impact on the R and D enterprise as a result of the political and economic crises that buffeted the nations of the former Soviet Union (FSU). Funding fell substantially, cadres aged, and many institutions ceased research altogether. At its nadir late in 1993, financing for science was perhaps one-twentieth of its Soviet level. Because of on-going disputes between scientists and federal officials, the future of the Russian Academy of Sciences (itself the direct inheritor of the Soviet Academy) remains in doubt.

Many observers, both within and outside the FSU, have noted the need for reforms in the administration, organization and funding of the Academy and other post-Soviet scientific institutions. They argue, for example, that the Academy's top-heavy administration and combination of honorific and research functions are inappropriate for the conduct of science in the twenty-first century. In *Science in the New Russia*, Irina Dezhina and Loren Graham, two long-term observers of Soviet and post-Soviet science and